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RETALIATORY DISCHARGE: A CAUSE OF
ACTION UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
CLAYTON ACT?
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides the statutory basis for
private antitrust standing by conferring the right to sue for
treble damages on "[any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."' Despite the apparent literal expansiveness of this
provision, however, the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress
did not intend the antitrust laws to remedy all injuries that
2
might conceivably be traced to the illegal conduct.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). The treble damage provision was originally enacted as § 7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210 (1890). Without substantive
change, § 7 of the Sherman Act was superseded by § 4 of the Clayton Act.
Section 7 was repealed in 1955 by the Act of July 7, 1955, § 3, 69 Stat. 283
(1955).
Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides for private "injunctive relief...
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws." 15
U.S.C. § 26 (1982). Injunctive relief under this provision is not dependent
upon the existence of actual injury or even threatened injury to "business
of property" in the sense that is required for obtaining damages under § 4.
See II P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrTRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPALS AND THEIR APPLICATION 135 (1978). The private entitlement to
equitable relief from antitrust violations is beyond the scope of this article.
2. Earlier decisions suggest that the provision should be read literally.
See Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660
(1961) ("allegations ... that plaintiff was damaged ... are all the law requires"); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957)
(courts "should not add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond
what is specifically set forth by Congress"); Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292, 295 (2d Cir. 1958) (L. Hand, J.) (suggesting literal
interpretation of § 4); Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d
487, 491 (2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J.) (language of § 4 quoted as unambiguous
and without limitation). Nevertheless, since the early 1970's the Supreme
Court has asserted that Congress did not intend to provide a damage remedy for all injuries causally connected to the violation. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-63 n.14 (1972) (citing with apparent approval
the virtually unanimous lower court policy of imposing limitations to § 4
standing).
Recently, the Court specifically articulated a policy that limits the damage remedies available for antitrust violations. In Blue Shield of Virginia v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) (5-4 decision), the majority acknowledged
two types of limitation: (1) to "particular classes of persons"; and, (2) "for
redress of particular forms of injury." Id. at 473. The first type of limitation
eliminates the possibility of double recovery that may result when both indirect and direct purchasers attempt to recover their portion of damages
attributable to the same violation, see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720 (1977) (indirect purchaser denied standing), or when both a state and
its citizens attempt to recover damages, the state asserting its rights in a
parens patriae capacity to recover for damages to the "general economy."
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After recognizing that the substantive context of the antitrust laws derives its meaning from common law principles, the
Supreme Court, in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. CaliforniaState Council of Carpenters,3 clarified its
intention to delineate the scope of the private remedy with reference to various common law rules that circumscribe the availability of damages in common law tort and contract litigation.
Consequently, the common law doctrines of proximate cause,
directness of injury, certainty of damages, and privity of con4
tract are now used to limit the scope of the section 4 remedy.
In addition to these common law damage limitations, the
Supreme Court recognizes that only certain types of injuries are
remediable under section 4.5 Although many types of injuries
may satisfy the common law damage limitation principles, the
legislative purpose of the antitrust laws is used to further limit
the availability of a section 4 recovery. Suggested first in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,6 and most recently in
Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready,7 only those plaintiffs suffering "antitrust injuries" have standing to bring a treble damage action against violators of the antitrust laws. Antitrust
injuries are those which Congress was likely to have been concerned with in making the particular defendant's conduct unlawful. 8 Using this criteria, the focal point of the standing
inquiry must be the policy used by Congress in classifying certain types of conduct as violative of the antitrust laws because it
is otherwise impossible to exhaustively enumerate the various
types of injuries sufficient to invoke section 4 standing. Standing will only be granted when the injury alleged derives from
the reason the defendant's conduct is made unlawful under the
antitrust laws. Mere causation between the defendant's conduct
and the alleged injury is insufficient to establish section 4 standSee Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (state denied standing).
The second limitation precludes recovery by individuals whose injuries are
deemed "too remote" from the antitrust violation. McCready, 457 U.S. at
476. To overcome this second barrier, a plaintiff must establish a "physical

and economic nexus between the alleged violation and the harm to the

plaintiff, and,. . . [a] relationship [between] the injury alleged [and] those
forms of injury about which Congress was likely to have been concerned in
making defendant's conduct unlawful and in providing a private remedy
under § 4. Id. at 478. This article deals primarily with this second type of

limitation.

3. 103 S.Ct. 897 (1983).

4. Id. at 905-06.
5. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478-84 (1982).
6. 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).

7. 457 U.S. 465, 482-84 (1982).
8. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. See infra notes 52-73 and

accompanying
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ing. Causation only establishes that the defendant is responsible for the plaintiff's injury; what it fails to establish, however, is
whether the defendant owes a duty to the particular plaintiff
and is therefore liable for the plaintiff's losses.
The concept of antitrust injury expressed in Brunswick, like
the common law limitation concepts noted above, is correctly
classified within the broad class of general antitrust standing
limitations. For purposes of understanding and clarity, however, it is unfortunate the Court failed to distinguish the common law concept of legal causation from antitrust injury when it
referred to the antitrust injury issue as being a question of "remoteness." As a legal and factual matter, the two concepts are
quite distinguishable in their purpose and application.
The concept of legal causation or proximate cause arbitrarily limits the liability of a wrongdoer to prevent the potentially
endless liability that would ensue if recovery was granted to all
parties arguably injured by the defendant's conduct. 10 Antitrust
injury, however, like the common law concept of duty, serves to
limit the wrongdoer's liability to those plaintiffs that bear some
special relationship to the wrongdoer."' Viewing antitrust injury as analogous to the concept of duty, rather than to the concept of remoteness, greatly clarifies any section 4 standing
analysis.
As discussed in greater depth below, the general underlying
purpose of the antitrust laws is to preserve and promote the efficient use of resources through market competition. 12 Section 4
furthers this purpose by imposing a duty upon all economic actors in a given market to not create market inefficiencies that
would injure other economic actors within that same market.
The duty under the antitrust laws, however, is only owed to
those economic actors within the market potentially injured by
the market inefficiencies. It is those actors who are entitled to
bring a section 4 action against those acting in conflict with such
laws.
Ever since the concept of antitrust injury was first enunciated in Brunswick, the combination of a generally confused judi9. 11 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, at 161-62.
10. McCready, 457 U.S. at 476-77.
11. Id. at 478-84. It is clear that the McCready Court intended to impose
a more profound limitation on § 4 than the limitation of proximate cause
which arbitrarily excludes plaintiffs whose injuries are too far removed

from the defendant's wrongful act. The Court required that there exist a
certain "relationship" between the injury alleged and "those forms of injury
about which Congress was likely to have been concerned in making defendant's conduct unlawful. . . ." 457 U.S. at 478.
12. See infra note 76.
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ciary and a stubborn plaintiffs bar has stifled the growth and
understanding of this concept. 13 It is the purpose of this article
to clarify this concept and illustrate its necessity to the antitrust
law by applying it to a standing situation which is presently unresolved by the federal courts. The first section to follow dissects two conflicting circuit court opinions and their differing
views on the reality of the antitrust injury concept as it applies
to a particular set of facts. The second section examines the
manner in which the concept was applied by the Supreme Court
in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready 14 and the ambiguities
which follow that decision. The third and final section applies
the antitrust injury concept to the unresolved standing issue
discussed in the first section. The article concludes that the antitrust injury concept is an essential element to the section 4
standing inquiry as expressed by the Supreme Court, and that
an employee who is discharged for refusing to engage in the illegal antitrust activities of his employer does not suffer an actionable antitrust injury.
THE ANTITRUST INJURY DOCTRINE: FACT OR FICTION?

In two recent decisions, the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Seventh i5 and Ninth 16 Circuits addressed the issue of
whether an employee who is discharged because of his refusal
to participate in the illegally anticompetitive practices of his employer has standing to sue under section 4.17 Although the facts
presented before each circuit were essentially identical, the
courts reached opposite conclusions. 18
In July of 1976, Robert C. Bichan was discharged from his
position as president of Chemetron Corporation's Industrial Gas
13. See Susman, Standing in Private Antitrust Cases: Where is the
Supreme Court Going?, 52 ANrIUST L.J. 465, 465 (1983).

14. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
15. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983).
16. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and
remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). Judgment was vacated and the case was

remanded to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 103 S.Ct. 897 (1983).
17. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., sub
nom. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982).
18. The federal district courts in Pennsylvania have confronted this issue but were unable to reach consistent conclusions. Shaw v. Russell
Trucking Line, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (standing found citing
Ostrofe); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (standing

denied refusing to follow Ostrofe); Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp.
550 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (standing denied distinguishing Ostrofe on the facts).
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Division. 19 Bichan alleged that Chemetron and six other companies in the business of selling and shipping industrial gas illegally conspired to fix gas prices, impose conditions of sale, and
allocate customers. 20 Bichan further maintained that upon his
refusal to adhere to these illegal practices, and upon his successful procurement of new customers in derogation of the conspiracy, he was fired by Chemetron and blacklisted by the
industry. 21 Bichan argued that he had standing under section 4
of the Clayton Act for lost salary and bonuses 22 directly resulting from Chemetron's violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.

23

In In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation,24 the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial 25 of Bichan's standing.
Central to that decision was the Supreme Court's seemingly
straight forward requirement, expressed in Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. ,26 that a plaintiff must suffer an "antitrust injury" in order to maintain standing to sue for trebel damages under section 4.27 Writing for the unanimous majority in
19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3-4, Bichan v. Chemetron sub nom.
In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982).

20. Brief of Appellant at 5, Bichan v. Chemetron sub nom. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982).
21. Id. at 6.
22. Section 4 will enable an injured party to sue for treble damages if he
is "injured in his business or property." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). There is some
question, therefore, as to whether the loss of salary and bonuses sustained
by Bichan constitutes "business or property" within the meaning of the provision. A number of courts have held that employees discharged as redundant after an allegedly unlawful merger have not been injured in their
"business or property." E.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Mans v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 352
F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Okla. 1971). At the same time, other courts upheld the
standing of employees when the defendant violated the antitrust laws by
tampering with competition in the employment market of the prospective
plaintiffs, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957);
Nichols v. Spencer Intl. Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967); or by creating a reduction in competition within a product market in which the prospective plaintiffs earned sales commissions, e.g., Dailey v. Quality School
Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967); Broyer v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 415 F.
Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 1 provides that "[eIvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal." Id.
24. 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983).
25. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., No. 80-C-3349 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 1981)
(order granting motion to dismiss). The district court's memorandum opinion is provided in full at Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13a-32a, Bichan v.
Chemetron Corp. sub nom. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514
(7th Cir. 1982).
26. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
27. Id. at 489.
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Brunswick, Justice Marshall defined "antitrust injury" as an injury that "reflect [sI the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. ' 28
Thus, according to the Seventh Circuit, Bichan did not have
standing because his injuries "did not derive from the lessening
of competition in the industrial gas industry. '2 9 Although it was
contended that Bichan's discharge was essential to the implementation of the anticompetitive scheme, 30 the Seventh Circuit
insisted that the antitrust laws are based solely upon congressional concern for the preservation of competition and not for
31
the prevention of employee coercion or discharge.
In the factually similar case of Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co. ,32
28. Id.
29. Industrial Gas, 681 F.2d at 518.
30. Bichan claimed that he had been actively increasing competition
and that had he not been terminated the anticompetitive scheme could not
have continued. Brief of Appellant at 11, Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., sub
nom. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982).
31. Industrial Gas, 681 F.2d at 519 (rejecting Ostrofe). The court also
rejected Bichan's reliance on cases which involved employees injured by
their employers' meddling with competitive forces in the particular plaintiff's employment market. Id. at 517. E.g., Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press Inc., 371 F.2d 332
(7th Cir. 1967). The court implied that Bichan would have had standing had
he alleged that the defendants' conspiracy to blacklist him from the industry was intended to restrict competitive conditions in the labor market and
that this restriction of his employment alternatives was directly related to
the anticompetitive constraints. Industrial Gas, 681 F.2d at 517 (1982).
However, since "the conspiracy Bichan charge [d] was aimed at restraining
competition in the industrial gas market, causing higher prices for consumers and potential loss of profits for nonconspiring producers", he alleged no
antitrust injury. Id.
In distinguishing between the conspiracy that was intended to restrict
competitive conditions in the product market and the conspiracy to blacklist Bichan from future employment in the industry, the court relied on the
"target area" test adopted by the Seventh Circuit for defining the scope of
§ 4 standing. Id. See Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1169
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979). The "test" is somewhat misguided insofar as it imparts too much emphasis on the violator's intent and
not enough emphasis on the relationship between the nature of the plaintiff's injury to the alleged violation. See II P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 1, at 198-201; Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 835 (1977). There is a strong indication that
the "target area" test did not survive the Supreme Court's most recent § 4
decision. See Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 479 & n.15
(1982) ('The availability of the § 4 remedy to some person who claims its
benefit is not a question of specific intent of the conspirators."); Note, Blue
Shield of Virginia v. McCready: Defining the Scope and Rationale of Consumer Standing to Sue Under Clayton Section 4, 17 J. MAR.L. REV. 195, 200
n.30 (1983).
32. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982) vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). Plaintiff,
Frank J. Ostrofe, marketing director and sales manager of defendant, paper
lithograph label manufacturer H.S. Crocker Co., was forced to resign and
was boycotted from the industry for refusing to cooperate with defendant's
illegal conspiracy to "rig bids, fix prices, and allocate markets." Id. at 1380.
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the Ninth Circuit found that Congress' concern was not as limited as the Seventh Circuit believed. Conceding that Congress
was concerned with market competition, 33 the Ostrofe court
maintained that Congress was equally concerned with the conduct of individuals acting on behalf of conspirators. The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that if Congress did not intend to remedy the
injuries of individuals dismissed for refusing to participate in
schemes violative of the antitrust laws, it would not have imposed criminal liability upon individuals acting in a representative capacity who do not refuse. 34 In granting standing to the
discharged plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit expressed its dissatisfaction with the numerous standing "tests" devised to limit the
breadth of the literal coverage of section 4.35 Following the
Third Circuit's approach, the Ostrofe court balanced the congressional "interest in effective enforcement of the antitrust
laws against the interest in avoiding vexatious litigation and excessive liability. '36 Finding neither of these negative factors
present, the court found the enforcement interest of overriding
importance. 37 In response to the defendant's claims that there
was no actionable antitrust injury present, the Ostrofe court recognized the apparent conflict between its construction of section
4 and that of the Supreme Court in Brunswick.38 Nevertheless,
the court was able to factually distinguish Brunswick.
Brunswick involved a damage suit brought by operators of
bowling alleys against the Brunswick Corporation, one of the
two largest manufacturers of bowling equipment in the United
States. 39 Brunswick sells its equipment to bowling alley operators, mostly on a secured credit basis because an average
purchase generally requires a major capital expenditure by the
operators. When the bowling industry went into a sharp decline
in the early 1960's, Brunswick experienced great difficulty collecting secured sales as they became due. As the percentage of
delinquent accounts dramatically increased, so did the repossessions under its chattel mortgages. Brunswick's attempts to
sell or lease the repossessed equipment met with only limited
success. Consequently, Brunswick began to acquire and operate the defaulting bowling centers when the equipment could
33. Id. at 1387.
34. Id. at 1387-88.
35. Id. at 1382.
36. Id. at 1383. See, e.g., Midwest Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group,
596 F.2d 573, 581-87 (3d Cir. 1979); Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc.,
552 F.2d 90, 99 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1973); Cromar Co. v.
Nuclear Materials and Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 1976).
37. Ostrofe, 670 F.2d at 1384-85.
38. Id. at 1386.
39. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 479 (1977).
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not be sold but a positive cash flow could be generated. 40
Bowling center operators that were competing with the defaulting centers alleged that Brunswick's acquisitions violated
§ 7 of the Clayton Act. 4 1 The competing centers contended that
"because of its size [Brunswick] had the capacity to lessen competition in the markets it had entered by driving smaller competitors out of business. '42 The plaintiffs' injury claim was
based on the theory that if Brunswick had not acquired the defaulting centers, and rather allowed them to go out of business,
43
the plaintiffs would have profited.
In reversing the court of appeals' finding that the plaintiffs
had standing, Justice Marshall explained that the injuries which
the plaintiffs sought to redress were clearly not the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. 44 The plaintiffs' losses
were the result of Brunswick's preservation of competition
among the bowling center operators and not of any impairment
of competition. 45 Since the alleged unlawful acquisitions deprived the plaintiffs of the benefits of increased concentration,
Marshall asserted that it would be "inimical to the purpose of
these laws to award damages for the type of injury claimed
here."46
It is in light of this factual scenario that Justice Marshall
wrote that "[t] he injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect
...of the violation. '47 Relying on this statement, the Seventh
Circuit held, in Industrial Gas, that the only injuries sufficient
to confer section 4 standing are those which reflect the anticompetitive effect of a violation.48 Ostrofe attached a quite different
meaning to this phrase by emphasizing the peculiarity of the
facts in Brunswick. The Ostrofe court held that if the injury
stems from the effect the violation has on market competition,
such injury must derive from its anticompetitive impact rather
than its procompetitive impact. If, however, the claim is not
40. Id. at 479-80.
41. Id. at 480. This section prohibits corporations from acquiring the
stock or assets of another or creating a monopoly in any line of commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
42. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 481.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 488.
45. Id.

46. Id. "The antitrust laws ...

were enacted for 'the protection of com-

petition, not competitors." Id. (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis by Brown Shoe Court)).
47. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.
48. "[A] mere relationship with the anticompetitive scheme is insuffi-

cient to bring the injured party within the scope of § 4; only where the injury is directly related to the scheme's anti-competitive effect does § 4
apply." Industrial Gas, 681 F.2d at 519.
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based upon an injury caused by the antitrust violation's effect
on competition, Brunswick is not controlling. 49 Insofar as Ostrofe dealt with an "injury stemming from conduct in furtherance of an antitrust violation," and not an injury stemming from
the effect of a violation upon competition, the Ninth Circuit was
able to distinguish Brunswick .50
The Brunswick court's attempt to delineate a general rule
for determining standing under section 4, however, could not
have been more clear. Although the facts of the two cases are
distinguishable, the law is not. As stated in Brunswick:
[Plaintiffs] must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury,
which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended
to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts
unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect
either of the violation or of the anticompetitive acts made possible
by the violation. It should, in short, be 'the type of loss that the
claimed violations ... would be likely to cause.' 51
In view of this language the Brunswick court must have intended that standing be granted only when the injury alleged
derives from the reason that the defendant's conduct violates
the antitrust laws.
ANTrrRUST INJURY REAFFIRMED:

THE MCCREADY CASE

At the same time the Seventh and Ninth Circuits were wrestling with conflicting interpretations of Brunswick, the Supreme
Court was re-examining the concept of antitrust injury. In Blue
Shield of Virginia v. McCready,52 a decision representing the
Supreme Court's most extensive analysis of the scope of section
4 standing, the-Court reaffirmed its view that only certain forms
of injuries are redressable under section 4. The McCready decision was clear that Brunswick would not be limited to its facts.
Relying exclusively on the Brunswick test quoted above, the
Court, after examining the type of injury alleged, found that the
injury reflected the anticompetitive effect of the alleged violation and that it flowed from that which made the violation
unlawful.
In McCready, a subscriber to a prepaid group health plan
purchased by her employer brought an antitrust suit against the
49. Ostrofe, 670 F.2d at 1387.
50. "Brunswick dealt with a claim based upon injury from the effect of
an alleged antitrust violation upon competition. The Court was simply not
concerned with a claim based upon injury stemming from conduct in furtherance of an antitrust violation." Id.
51. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
52. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
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health insurer, Blue Shield of Virginia (Blue Shield) and the
Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia (psychiatrists). The plan
explicitly provided reimbursement for costs incurred by subscribers attributable to outpatient treatment for mental and nervous disorders, including psychotherapy. In response to an
alleged conspiracy between the defendants to induce subscribers to obtain psychotherapy from psychiatrists rather than from
psychologists, Blue Shield provided reimbursement only for
53
services obtained from the former group of professionals.
Carol McCready, a subscriber who was treated by a clinical
psychologist, submitted claims to Blue Shield for reimbursement of costs she incurred for psychotherapeutical services.
Blue Shield refused to reimburse her for the services. In response to the refusal, McCready brought a treble damage action
alleging that the defendants engaged in an unlawful conspiracy
in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act 54 "to exclude and
boycott clinical psychologists from receiving compensation
under [the Blue Shield plans]. ' ' 55 She contended that Blue
Shield's failure to reimburse her had been in furtherance of the
conspiracy that had caused her injuries entitling her to treble
56
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
In upholding McCready's standing, the majority held that
her injury was of a type that Congress sought to redress in providing a private remedy for antitrust violations. 57 The defendants, relying on Brunswick, claimed that because McCready did
not pay artificially inflated psychiatrist's fees, she could not establish the requisite antitrust injury. 58 Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, rejected the defendants' argument finding their
reading of Brunswick too narrow. 59 The Court ruled that an injury attributable to price increases resulting from a lessening of
competitive forces in a market is not the only type of injury protected by section 4. 60 The Court held that the "Hobson's choice"
imposed upon subscribers between forfeiting reimbursement by
obtaining services from a psychologist and receiving reimbursement by foregoing treatment by the practitioner of their choice
would result in an antitrust injury regardless of which fate was
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 469-70.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See supra note 23.
McCready, 457 U.S. at 470.
Id.
Id. at 483. See supra note 44.
McCready, 457 U.S. at 481.

59. Id. at 482.
60. Id. at 482-83.
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61

Had McCready yielded to Blue Shield's coercion she would
have suffered an injury indirectly attributable to the suppression of competition in the psychotherapy market. 6 2 In contrast,
the injury she actually suffered, "in the form of an increase in
the net cost of her psychologist's services," was directly attributable to suppressed competition. 63 In keeping with Brunswick,
either type of injury would "reflect the anticompetitive effect
...of the violation" sufficient to constitute an antitrust injury
remediable under section 4.64
To illustrate this latter point, McCready's injury can be compared to that suffered by a consumer in a product market anticompetitively affected by a price-fixing conspiracy. When a
consumer purchases a product of his choice, which is artificially
inflated by a conspiratorial scheme, that consumer suffers an antitrust injury sufficient to attain section 4 standing. 65 Similarly,
when McCready was forced to forego reimbursement for obtaining the services of her choice, she too suffered antitrust in61. Id. at 483. The dissenters insisted that McCready suffered no antitrust injury. Writing for the dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that McCready was unable to show any lessening of competition because her injury
was sustained as a result of Blue Shield'sfailure to coerce her to patronize
psychiatrists. Id. at 489 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As illustrated by Justice Brennan's majority opinion, the anticompetitive effects of a violation
cannot be viewed so narrowly. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying
text.
62. McCready, 457 U.S. at 483. When competition is suppressed, the
consumer typically suffers injury reflecting this anticompetitive effect in
one of two ways. The monopolistic pricing that is made possible by the reduction of competition injures those purchasers of the monopolized product
who pay its anticompetitively inflated price. Those consumers who choose
not to pay the inflated price purchase substitute products to satisfy their
demand. Although the substituted product is cheaper than the anticompetitively priced product originally preferred by the consumer, it costs more
than the original product did before the anticompetitive effect. See infra
notes 76 and 77 and accompanying text. McCready would have been included in this latter class of consumers had Blue Shield's coercive efforts
successfully caused her to obtain the services of a psychiatrist. While the
services of a psychiatrist would not cost her more monetarily (costs would
be reimbursed), she would suffer intangibly in having lost the opportunity
to choose among professional psychotherapists.
63. McCready, 457 U.S. at 483.
64. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.
65. II P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, at 183, see Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). It is inherent in the language of both of these
cases that the ultimate consumer of anticompetitively priced goods would
sustain injuries sufficient to confer standing if he purchased directly from
the defendant. For purposes of illustration it is assumed that no intermediary that may have absorbed the entire loss stands between the defendant,
and the plaintiff. It is also assumed that the consumer's injury can be ascertained without undue speculation. See McCready, 457 U.S. at 474, 475 n.11.
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jury. 66 The "price" differential, due to the anticompetitive
scheme, was the cost of not being reimbursed by Blue Shield.
As Industrial Gas establishes, the discharged employee
does not suffer this type of injury. 67 Bichan's loss of salary is not
the result of the deprivation of a consumer product or service
choice caused by suppressed competition; nor is it the result of
an artificially inflated price of obtaining a product or service, as
was the injury suffered by the plaintiffs in McCready. Moreover,
unlike the Blue Shield subscribers, Bichan would derive no economic benefit by judicial maintenance of competition in a product or service market.
On its face, however, McCready can be read to support the
68
case of standing for the wrongfully discharged employee.
Without a close examination of the facts, McCready's majority
opinion contains ample language strikingly similar to that used
in the Ostrofe rationale. After rejecting the defendants' reliance
on Brunswick, Justice Brennan wrote: "while an increase in
price resulting from a dampening of competitive market forces
is assuredly one type of injury for which § 4 potentially offers
redress,.

. .

that is not the only form of injury remediable under

§ 4.''69 Subsequent courts following the Ostrofe view could rely
on this language to support the unfounded notion that injuries
other than those caused by an antitrust violation's effect on competition may be sufficient to confer section 4 standing. 70 By borrowing further, such courts could justify a grant of standing to a
discharged employee by comparing his injuries to those sustained by McCready, both of which were "the consequences of
[the defendants'] attempt to pursue [an anticompetitive]
scheme." 7 '
The McCready defendants, however, were clearly erroneous
in arguing that the injury to a consumer due to a price increase
is the only form of injury remediable under section 4. Justice
Brennan's rejection of this contention, however, must not be
misread to signify the beginning of an open-door antitrust standing policy that allows plaintiffs to obtain standing without trac66. See supra note 62.
67. Industrial Gas, 681 F.2d at 519.
68. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Bichan v. Chemetron, sub
nom. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation, 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982).
69. McCready, 457 U.S. at 482-83.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 49 and 50.
71. McCready, 457 U.S. at 483. See Comment, Right to Sue Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act-The Employee Dischargedfor Refusal to Participate in the Anticompetitive Practicesof His Employer: Bichan v. Chemetron
Corp. Examined in Light of Blue Shield v. McCready, 1983 B.Y.U.L. REV.
173, 190 (1983) (author relies on McCready language to justify Ostrofe
result).
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ing their injuries to the reason the defendants' acts are alleged
to be unlawful. Such a reading of McCready would be overly
broad, particularly in light of Brennan's illustration of how the
anticompetitive effects of the alleged violation inflicted injuries
upon Blue Shield's subscribers regardless of whether they forfeited reimbursement or forfeited treatment by the practitioner
of their choice. 72 Nevertheless, semantic analogies can be
drawn by ignoring the distinction between those plaintiffs who
are economic actors in the restrained market and those who are
not. Critical of the logical inadequacies of such reasoning, one
commentator noted that "[lawI grows by analogizing new situations to old, and antitrust may move still further away from a
policy of competition simply by realizing the potentialities in'73
herent in the principles it now espouses.
DISTINGUISHING MARKET INJURIES FROM PERSONAL INJURIES

In discussing the types of injuries remediable under section
4, the McCready court compared its inquiry to the common law
concept of remoteness of injury.7 4 The policy of imposing a limitation on section 4 standing, however, is based on a more
profound principle than that which prevents the potential endless liability that would ensue if the statute were read literally.
More significant is the limitation of standing to only those plaintiffs who have suffered injuries that result from the anticompetitive nature of the substantive violation. Thus, under the guise of
remoteness, the Court in McCready imposed a further limitation to exclude those plaintiffs whose injuries are insufficiently
related to Congress' core concerns about prohibiting the anti75
trust defendant's course of conduct.
The primary objective of the procompetitive policy of antitrust is to enhance consumer welfare through the efficient use
and allocation of scarce resources. 76 Economic inefficiencies oc72. McCready, 457 U.S. at 483-84.
73. R.
(1978).

BORK,THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:

A POLICY

AT WAR WITH ITSELF

5

74. In limiting the availability of the § 4 remedy for redress of particular
forms of injury, McCready requires a plaintiff to show that a physical and
economic nexus exists between the alleged violation and the harm he sus-

tains. 457 U.S. at 478. The Court imposed this restriction conceding, however, that its application is "no less elusive than that employed traditionally
by courts at common law with respect to the matter of 'proximate cause.'"
Id. at 477. The Court further admitted that the arbitrariness of this principle makes it "hardly a rigorous analytical tool." Id. at 477 n.13 (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 351-52, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (Andrews,
J., dissenting)).

75. 457 U.S. at 478.
76. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
(economic efficiency articulated as the basis for determining legality of ver-

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 17:439

cur when the absence of competition enables sellers to reduce
output so as to artificially inflate the price of the product they
sell.77 An increase in the price of the product above its cost (including a provision for reasonable profits) induces consumers to
purchase substitute products that cost more to produce. 78 This
results in the use of greater amounts of society's scarce re79
sources to satisfy the same consumer demand.
The policy of limiting section 4 standing to those plaintiffs
who have been injured by the anticompetitive effect of a violation is essential to prevent recovery for injuries that do not emanate from inefficiencies in the marketplace. 80 Although
plaintiffs alleging injuries of this type may still be able to prove
that the defendant violated a particular antitrust provision, and
that their injuries are causally connected to the defendant's conduct, such plaintiffs, in effect, must assert the injuries of third
parties as well (i.e., injuries of those parties intended to be protical restraints); II P. AREEDA &D. TURNER, supra note 1, at 8-12 (economic
efficiency and progressiveness goal generally "paramount" in antitrust case
law); R. BORK, supra note 73, at 89 (consumer welfare enhancement
through economic efficiency is the exclusive goal of antitrust); E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 1 (2d ed. 1981) ("It is
generally agreed that the primary goal of antitrust is to increase consumer
welfare through a maximization of national wealth."); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 4 (1976) (economic efficiency should
be the only goal of antitrust; there is no ". . .justification for using the antitrust laws to attain goals unrelated or antithetical to efficiency . ..");
Calvani, The Mushrooming Brunswick Defense: Injury to Competition, Not
to Plaintiff, 50 ANTrrRUST L.J. 319, 338 (1981) (Antitrust is increasingly becoming "the province of consumer welfare and economic efficiency" among
the courts and at the Supreme Court in particular.); Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency-An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI.
L. REV. 467, 467-68 (1980). (There is a present trend at the Supreme Court
towards recognizing that the predominant goal of antitrust enforcement is
the enhancement of economic efficiency through competition rather than
the subsidization of small inefficient businesses). But see L. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 1-10 (1977) (principles of economic
efficiency are "subject to stringent theoretical conditions which are never
fulfilled in the real world").
77. R. POSNER, supra note 76, at 9-10.
78. Id. at 10.
79. Id.
80. Two prominent authorities in the field have argued that an economic
justification exists for limiting § 4 damages so that "over-deterrence" does
not occur:
If treble damage actions are to promote economic efficiency, the size of
the award should approximate the social cost or inefficiency caused by
the violation discounted by the likelihood that the conduct will be discovered and penalized. Firms will not engage in a practice if their expected gain in doing so is less than their expected (private) cost,
including any penalties for violating the antitrust laws. If this expected
cost exceeds the social cost, firms will be deterred from pursuing activities that promise greater value than any inefficiency resulting from
those activities.
Page, supra note 76, at 472. Accord R. POSNER, supra note 76, at 221-22.
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tected by Congress in enacting the antitrust laws). A grant of
standing under these circumstances therefore, creates a situation in which the plaintiffs ability to maintain his action is necessarily dependent upon the existence of third party injuries.
Absent these third party injuries, there would be no violation of
the antitrust laws.
The employee who is discharged because of his refusal to
participate in his employer's illegal antitrust activities has not
personally suffered an antitrust injury. The injury that he does
suffer is not the result of any inefficient allocation of resources
created by his employer. The injury personally suffered by the
employee, and the employer's conduct that created that personal injury, are separate and distinct from the injury to the
market and his employer's conduct that created the market injury. At issue are two distinguishable courses of conduct. Although both courses of conduct are admittedly repugnant to
public policy, only the latter type of conduct was intended to be
discouraged by Congress through the enactment of the antitrust
statutes.
Retaliatory discharge involves a public concern distinguishable in purpose from those concerns for market efficiency that
underlie the antitrust laws. Its growing recognition as a common law tort is a product of the public's general distaste for the
employer's coercive use of a superior bargaining position to
either prevent employees from exercising legal rights or induce
them to engage in illegal activities. 81 Employer coercion aimed
at inducing employee involvement in illegal antitrust activities
is only a single category among the vast set of factual situations
that constitute tortious retaliatory discharge. 82 Recognition by
the federal courts of a private right of action under the antitrust
statutes for such employees would represent only a small step
in an attempt to correct a more general public policy violation.
Until Congress and the federal judiciary are prepared to recognize a private right of action for employees discharged for their
81. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421
N.E.2d 876 (1981) (employee discharged for supplying information to local
law enforcement authorities that employer might be involved in certain
criminal violations); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353
(1979) (employee discharged for asserting claim under state workman's
compensation statute); See generally Platt, Rethinking the Right of Employ-

ers to Terminate At- Will Employees, 15 J. MAR. L. REV. 633 (1982).
82. Retaliatory discharge of an employee by reason of his refusal to engage in any federal statutory violation would presumably be recognized as a
state tort in those states which have recognized a cause of action for wrongful or retaliatory discharge. For a fairly recent examination of the status of
the law on wrongful or retaliatory discharge see Annot., 12 A.L.R. 4th 544
(1982) and Annot., 9 A.L.R. 4th 330 (1982) and accompanying pocket parts.
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refusal to violate any federal statute, the abatement of wrongful
employee coercion should be left to the states to tackle.
CONCLUSION

The antitrust injury concept established by the Supreme
Court in Brunswick was just the first step in the Court's attempt
to enunciate an understandable approach to the section 4 standing issue. The concept's likeness to the duty issue, and the recent application of common law principles of causation and
proximate cause, is an indication of a possible trend in this area
toward the establishment of a clear set of primafacie pleading
elements for private antitrust plaintiffs. The added clarity and
certainty of the section 4 standing barriers, through the development of these elements, would be a welcome reversal of the
present trend in antitrust standing litigation toward increasing
confusion and complexity.
It is clear from reading the Supreme Court's most recent
standing analysis that the Brunswick test of antitrust injury
must be met by all private antitrust plaintiffs and cannot be semantically sidestepped as was done by the Ninth Circuit in Ostrofe. The requirement logically links the section 4 analysis to
the underlying purpose of the substantive antitrust provisions
by limiting antitrust standing to those plaintiffs whose injuries
derive from market inefficiencies created by antitrust violators.
As exemplified by the Industrial Gas/Ostrofe debate, the requirement correctly denies standing to those plaintiffs whose injuries, although causally connected to the defendant's conduct,
derive not from market inefficiencies, but rather from tortious
interferences that are personal in nature and that were not originally intended to be remedied by the antitrust laws.
Michael L. Gold

